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Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaini:iffs demand the State Insurance Fund 
bear its share proportionately as its interest appears, 
of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs in 
1 
recovering from third parties, sums paid to or for 
plaintiffs by the Fund for medical and hospital ex-
penses and for compensation for injuries occasioned 
by on-the-job accidents caused by such third parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs received Summary Judgment by JVIem-
orandum Decision based upon agreed facts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-respondents seek affirmation of the 
District Court judgment and a determination that 
costs as v;ell as attorney fees are reimbursable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant accurately states the facts, i. e., that 
plaintiffs received on-the-job injuries; they received 
medical payments and compensation from the State 
Insurance Fund; they pressed claims against third 
parties responsible for their injuries, made recovery 
and reimbursed under protest or allmved under pro-
test payment to the Fund which refused to pay any 
portion of attorneys' fees and costs; they brought 
suit after the decision in lVorthen v. Shurtleff, 19 
Utah 2nd 80, 426 P2d 223 against the Utah State 
Department of Finance as Adn1inistrator of the State 
Insurance Fund for reimbursement of defendant's 
share proportionately of such costs and attorneys' 
fees. 
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The amounts paid, dates of payment and the 
fact of payment (or allowing payment) under pro-
test are not in dispute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY ITS FAIR SHARE 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
A. On principles of contribution irrespective 
of any statute. 
On ordinary principles of contribution, each re-
cipient of benefits from the third party law suit ought 
to bear his share of the burdens of such suit. 
18 AM Jur 2nd Contribution expresses this con-
cept as follows: 
§ 1. Generally; definitions. 
The principle or doctrine of contribution 
is one of equality in bearing a common bur-
den. Contribution has been defined as a pay-
ment made by each person, or by any of sev-
eral persons, having a common interest or lia-
bility, of his share in the loss suffered or in 
the money necessarily paid by one of the par-
ties in behalf of the others. The right of con-
tribution has also been variously described as 
the right of one who has discharged a common 
liability or burden, to recover of another, also 
liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to 
pay or bear; as the right enjoyed by a person 
who is jointly liable with others and has paid 
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more than his proper share in discharge of the 
joint liability to force them to reimburse him 
to the extent of their liability; and as an equi-
ty which arises when one of several parties 
liable on a common debt discharges the ob-
ligation for the benefit of all. 
In accordance with these definitions, the 
general rule is that one who is compelled to 
pay or satisfy the whole or to bear more than 
his just share of a common burden or obliga-
tion, upon which several persons are equally 
liable or which they are bound to discharge, 
is entitled to contribution against the others 
to obtain from them payment of their respec-
tive shares. In other words, when any burden 
ought, from the relationship of the parties or 
in respect of property held by them, to be 
equally borne and each party is in aequali 
jure, contribution is due if one has been com-
pelled to pay more than his share. The doc-
trine is founded not upon contract, but upon 
principles of equality, and assists in the fair 
and just division of losses, preventing unfair-
ness and injustice. And since the doctrine of 
contribution has its basis in the broad prin-
ciples of equity, it should be liberally applied. 
The same principle was enunciated in VVorthen 
v. Shurtleff, 19 Utah 2d 80, 426, P2d 223 at 83, the 
court saying: 
"Where each of the parties has the right 
to bring the action and one takes the initiative 
and obtains recovery for the benefit of both, 
it is only fair that each bear his share of the 
expenses necessarily incurred in doing so." 
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B. The Statute requires reimbursement. 
The statute involved is 35-1-62 UCA 1953 and 
reads as follows: 
vVhen an injury or death for which com-
pensation is payable under this title shall have 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, 
the injured employee, or in case of death his 
dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal rep-
resentative may also have an action for dam-
ages against such third person. If compensa-
tion is claimed and the employer or insurance 
carrier becomes obligated to pay compensa-
tion, the employer or insurance carrier shall 
become trustee of the cause of action against 
the third party and may bring and maintain 
the action either in its own name or in the 
name of the injured employee, or his heirs 
or the personal representative of the deceas-
ed, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without 
the consent of the commission. 
If any recovery is obtained against such 
third person it shall be disbursed as follows: 
( 1) The reasonable expense of the ac-
tion, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid 
and charged proportionately against the par-
ties as their interests may appear. 
(2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full for all 
payments made. 
( 3) The balance shall be paid to the in-
jured employee or his heirs in case of death, 
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to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any 
obligation thereafter accruing against the per-
son liable for compensation. 
In interpreting the statute, this court in lVor-
then v. Shurtleff, supra, an identical case, said: 
"The basic purpose of this statute is that 
of making an equitable arrangement between 
an injured employee, and an insurer (or em-
ployer) who pays him workmen's compensa-
tion, with respect to a cause of action against 
a third party who injures the employee. It 
preserves the action to the employee, but it 
prevents him from having double recovery 
by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. 
It also gives the insurer the right to bring 
the action, but allows it only to reimburse it-
self and then pay any balance to the em-
ployee. 
Where each of the parties has the right 
to bring the action and one takes the initia-
tive and obtains a recovery for the benefit of 
both, it is only fair that each bear his share 
of the expenses necessarily incurred in doing 
so. That this is the meaning intended in para-
graph ( 1) seems unmistakably clear. In pro-
viding that if recovery is obtained against the 
third party the expenses including attorney's 
fees shall be charged 'proportionately against 
the parties as their interests may appear,' it 
is to be noted that those terms could not apply 
to the two parties to the original action (plain-
tiff Worthen and defendant Shurtleff and An-
drews) because Worthen receives the money 
from Shurtleff and Andrews, who have no fur-
ther interest in it after paying it over. There-
fore, the only possible 'parties' who have 'in-
terests' in the money are VVorthen and The 
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State Insurance Fund (the latter being en-
titled to reimbursement.) It thus follows that 
Sec. ( 1 ), with unmistakably clarity requires 
that the expenses and attorney's fees be charg-
ed proportionately against these 'parties' 
(Worthen and The State Insurance Fund) 
as their 'interests' appear. It is more reason-
able to assume that the Legislature intended 
this application of the statute which comports 
with its equitable purpose than one which 
would bring about a contrary result. 
In addition to the equitable result arriv-
ed at by giving priority to paragraph ( 1) as 
we have discussed above, there is another per-
suasive consideration which supports that con-
clusion. When a statute undertakes an allo-
cation of funds, the sequence in which it does 
so should be regarded as having some signifi-
cance. This perhaps would be plainer if the 
statute had stated that the funds recovered 
should be disbursed 'first,' 'second,' and 'third.' 
However, the intent shown thereby is not 
necessarily different from the priority of allo-
cation which would be indicated by using the 
numerals ( 1 ) , ( 2), and ( 3) . If we do as the 
statute says and make the allocation provided 
for in paragraph ( 1) first, that is, charging 
the recovery with the costs and attorney's fees 
in proportion to the interests of the parties, the 
disbursement stated first is made first, and has 
priority over the provision for disbursements 
which follovvs it in paragraph (2). Then the 
reimbursement to the insurer is made from the 
funds remaining and to extent possible after 
the first requirement for disbursement is com-
plied with. This application of the statute can 
be reconciled with the requirement that the 
insurer be 'reimbursed in full by regarding 
that phrase simply meaning reimbursement 
for its full share after the prior requirement 
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of the statute is fulfilled, and that the insurer 
cannot be compelled to take less than its pro-
portionate share in any compromise or settle-
ment arranged by others." 
In overruling the earlier case of !HcConnel v. 
Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P 2d 
394, the court said, Page 84: 
We have so concluded cognizant of Mc-
Connell v. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 
2d 395, 375 P2d 394, in which the insurance 
carrier was not made a party, but in so far 
as this case may be inconsistent with McCon-
nell, that case is overruled. Consistent with our 
holding here, see Charles Seligman Distribut-
ing Co. v. Brown (Ky.), 360 S.W.2d 509, 511. 
That case is directly in point and supports plain-
tiffs' position here. The injured workman sued a 
Third Party and recovered damages. The Kentucky 
statute provides that the employee has to reimburse 
the employer or his insurer for the amount paid out 
as compensation. Reversing two prior cases the Court 
stated and held: 
" ... Moreover, regardless of the respec-
tive amounts recovered, where the employer 
or its insurer has a reasonable opportunity to 
intervene in the employee's action against the 
Third Party tortfeasor, but chooses not to do 
so it would be inequitable to require the em-
ployee to bear the attorney fees on that por-
tion of the recovery which K.R.S. 342.055 
obliges him to pay over to the employer or its 
insurer ... " Supra at 510. 
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In McConnell vs. The Commission of Finance 
13 Utah 2d 395, 375 Pac. 2d 394, 1962, an earlier 
case, The Utah Supreme Court declined to require 
the fund to pay its proportionate share of attorney's 
and costs because the Insurance Fund was not made 
a party, the court saying, page 396: 
"If an insurance carrier initiates an action 
under this statute against the third party, or 
its made a party in an action initiated by the 
injured employee, any attorney's fees incur-
red by it would fall within the priority pro-
vided in sub-section 1 (of the statute), how-
ever in the instant case the State Insurance 
Fund was not a party to the action and did 
not insure any legal expenses." 
The court there took a narrow view of the word 
"party" and should have taken a broad view as in 
Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F2 CA Calif. where 
the court defines the word "party" as follows: 
"In its broadest meaning the word party 
includes one concerned with, conducting, or 
taking part in any matter or proceeding, 
whether he is named or participates as formal 
party or not." 
C. There is no problem of retroactive appli-
cation. 
Defendant contends application of the Worthen 
case rule would be retroactive therefore, unfair. Yet 
in the Worthen case the contribution rule was ap-
plied in 1967 to funds obtained between 1964 and 
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1967 in suit on a December 2, 1964 accident, thus the 
application was similar to that requested here. 
The only difference is that in the Worthen case 
the funds vvere held by the court and here they were 
paid, or the Fund allowed to obtain same under 
protest; and the law would never shy from this slight 
inconvenience. 
Defendant asserts that the Worthen case chang-
ed the law so that contribution could only be grant-
ed on cases arising after the \IV orthen decision, and 
this despite the fact that the vVorthen case itself was 
applied retroactively. 
It vvould seem that the \V orthen case declared 
what the law had always been, it being the general 
rule as stated in numerous cases in 10 ALR 3d 1371, 
that the judicial ruling of a precedent has both pros-
pective and retroactive effect unless the overruling 
decision declares that it shall have only prospective 
effect. 
An annotation of numerous cases involving the 
application of an overruling decision is found in 10 
ALR 3d 13 71. The general rule or traditional theo-
ry of the unlimited retroactive operation that has 
existed for many years is stated at page 1382 as fol-
lows: 
"The traditional view was that by over-
ruling a prior decision the Court does not 'pre-
10 
tend to make a new law, but to vindicate the 
old one from misrepresentation .... It is de-
clared, not that such a sentence was bad law, 
but that it was not law.' Accordingly, the cor-
rect (new) rule would naturally apply to all 
questions subsequently coming before the 
Court, regardless of the chronolgy of the fac-
tual events from which the legal rights and 
liabilities at issue arose. 
"This view was founded on the notion 
that a Court is merely a discoverer rather than 
a maker of the law, and that a Court's earlier 
decisions are mere evidences of the law and 
not the law itself. Such a notion still finds ex-
pression in many decisions." 
A landmark case cited as standing for this po-
sition is the case of Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29, 
68 P .Ed. 54 7, 44 C. Ct. 246 Ct 924). Also there cited 
as enunciating this rule are a number of Circuit 
Court opinions, including three from the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Jackson v. Harris, 43 F2d 513 CC.A. 10 Okla., 
1930); Sunray Oil Company v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 14 7 F2d 962 ( C.A. 10 1945), cert. 
den., 325 U.S. 861, 89 L.Ed. 1982, 65 S.Ct. 1201; and 
J\,1assaglia v. Commissioner 286 F2d 258 CC.A. 10 
1961). In Sunray Oil Company, the Court speaking 
through Chief Judge Phillips said: 
"It is a general rule that the decisions of 
the highest appellate court of a jurisdiction 
overruling a former decision is retrospective 
in its operation. In effect, it declares that the 
former decision never was law." 
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See also Ragghianti v. Sherwin, 196 Cal. App. 
2d 345, 16 Cal. Rpt. 583 ( 1961); Legg's Estate v. 
C.I.R., 114 F2d 760 CC.A. 4, 1940); Peterson v. John 
Hancock lHutual Insurance Company, 116 F2d 148 
CC.A. 8, 1940). 
Defendant, in its memorandum cites several 
cases, which, while acknowledging this general rule, 
indicates an exception thereto, where a contract has 
been entered into in reliance upon a Legislative en-
actment as it was construed by earlier decisions. The 
cases cited by defendant involve situations where 
bonds or similar contractual obligations had been 
issued or incurred based directly upon a decision 
upholding a statute, which decision was subsequent-
ly overruled. The court properly in those situations 
held that the contractual obligation that was enter-
ed into between the parties in reliance on such prior 
decision should not be disturbed by the later over-
ruling decision. It is respectfully submitted that any 
such exception to the general rule of retroactivity 
has no application in this present case, because the 
plaintiff and defendant never entered into any con-
tracts of any kind and because the rights and obli-
gations between them arise out of the contribution 




PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE TIMELY. 
A. The Statute of Limitations is not a bar. 
The district court in deciding the instant case, 
with regard to the Statute of Limitations, said: 
"I am also of the opinion that the four 
year statute of limitations of Section 78-12-25, 
UCA 1953, applies, since I consider that the 
action is based upon a contract for services 
rendered rather than an action for a liability 
created by statute (Section 78-12-26-3-year 
statute) or against an officer who is a tax col-
lector (Section 78-12-31-6-month statute). 
"The file in each case reflects that the re-
spective plaintiffs have each filed his complaint 
within the four-year period from the date the 
funds were paid to the state to reimburse the 
State Insurance Fund, and, in my opinion, the 
date of such reimbursement would constitute 
the date upon which the statute of limitations 
would begin to run." 
He is well supported by case law as summariz-
ed in 18 Am Jur 2d Contribution, as follows: 
§90. Statute of limitations applicable. 
Considerable contrariety exists among the 
decisions as to what statute of limitations is 
applicable to the right of a paying obligor 
to recover contribution from his co-obligors. 
Most of this appears to result from the fact 
that the following different remedies are avail-
able for the enforcement of the right to con-
tribution: an action at law on the implied 
contract; a suit in equity to equalize the bur-
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den which should be borne in common; proce-
dure as successor to rights and remedies of the 
creditor, where allowable; and combinations 
of these remedies. A simple action for contri-
bution by one co-obligor against another is 
generally held, however, to be governed by the 
statute of limitations applicable to actions bas-
ed on implied contracts or those not in writing; 
for purposes of limitations the action may be 
regarded as one for a debt not evidenced by 
writing, or as one to recover, upon an implied 
promise, money paid for the defendant's bene-
fit. 
As a general rule, where contribution is 
sought between parties who were co-obligors 
to another upon a written contract, the stat-
ute of limitations governing is not that relat-
ing to actions founded upon such a contract 
or instrument in writing, but rather that re-
lating to contracts not in writing or to an im-
plied promise or contract. But a statute of limi-
tations governing actions upon contracts, ex-
press or implied, "arising out of a written 
agreement," has been held applicable to such 
a case. Of course, where the parties expressly 
contract for the right of contribution itself, 
the statute of limitations applicable to con-
tracts in writing applies. 
The origin of the action is alvvays material in 
determining \vhat statute of limitations applies. 18 
Am Jur 2d Contributions is helpful here: 
4. Basis and Origin of Right. 
The doctrine of contribution had its ori-
gin in courts of equity, upon the principle that 
equality among those in aequali jure is deem-
ed to be equity, and at first was available only 
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in courts of equity. The common law has 
adopted and given effect to this equitable prin-
ciple, and the principle also obtains under the 
civil law. Unlike the courts at common law, 
however, equity resorts to no fiction of an 
implied promise to contribute in case of un-
equal payments by co-obligors. It equalizes 
burdens and recognizes and enforces the rea-
sonable expectations of the co-obligors because 
it is just and right in good morals and not be-
cause of any supposed promise between them. 
The meaning of the statement, often 
made, that contribution is not founded upon 
contract is sometimes misapprehended. It 
means only that there need not be an express 
contract for the right of contribution to exist, 
and that it can exist upon principles of equity 
and natural justice and independently of any 
contract. Under the circumstances of many 
cases the right to contribution may well be 
considered as resting alike upon principles of 
equity and upon contract for its foundation. 
The right to contribution and the legal duty to 
contribute may be qualified or controlled by 
agreement, or may even arise therefrom; and 
in the absence of an express agreement, con-
tribution may be enforceable on the theory of 
a contract implied in law or in fact. The right 
to contribution depends upon a common bur-
den or indebtedness, and not upon the fact 
that all the parties are bound in writing. An 
agreement for joint liability giving a right to 
and duty of contribution between parties who 
are prima facie severally and successively li-
able upon a written instrument may be infer-
red from the circumstances of the case. 
§5. Availability in courts of law. 
Although the doctrine of contribution ori-
ginated in courts of equity, it was subsequent-
15 
ly adopted by courts of law and is now univer-
sally applied therein. In order to make the doc-
trine consistent with the forms, theories, and 
practices of courts of law, the fiction of an 
implied contract by one obligor to contribute 
to another co-obligor who had been compelled 
to pay more than his share of the obligation 
\ 1vas adopted. From the language of the courts 
it would seem that ordinarily the implied con-
tract in such a case is one implied in law based 
on the equitable obligation to equalize the 
common burden, although it is doubtless true 
that universal recognition of the doctrine of 
contribution may well justify the view that 
a contract for contribution may be implied in 
fact among parties who join in undertaking 
some common burden or obligation. Further-
more, since in most jurisdictions now only one 
form of action, known as the "civil action," 
is substituted in place of the common - law 
forms of action, formal distinctions between 
forms of action and between legal and equit-
able actions have been abolished.; and hence 
it would appear that in such jurisdictions at 
least it is no longer necessary for a court to 
resort to the fiction of an implied contract in 
justification of an action brought before it for 
contribution. 
As to the statute of limitations, the following 
code provisions deserve consideration: 
78-12-23. Within six years. 
2. An action upon any contract, obliga-
tion or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing, except those mentioned in the pre-
ceding section. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
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( 1) An action upon a contract, obliga-
tion or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment in writing; also on an open account for 
goods, wares and merchandise, and for any 
article charged in a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services ren-
dered, or materials furnished; provided, that 
action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years af-
ter the last charge is made or the last payment 
is received. 
( 2) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
( 1) An action for waste or trespass 
upon or injury to real property; provided, that 
when waste or trespass is committed by means 
of underground works upon any mining claim, 
the cause of action shall not be deemed to 
have accrued until the discovery by the ag-
grieved party of the facts constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
( 2) An action for taking, detaining or 
injuring personal property, including actions 
for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in 
all cases where the subject of the action is a 
domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," having upon it at the time of its 
loss a recorded mark or brand, if such animal 
had strayed or \Vas stolen from the true own-
er without his fault, the cause shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the owner has 
actual knowledge of such facts as would put 
a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the pos-
session thereof by the defendant. 
17 
( 3) An action for relief on the ground 
of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action 
in such case shall not be deemed to have ac-
crued until the discovery by the aggrieved par-
ty of the facts constituting the fraud or mis-
take. 
( 4) An action for a liability created by 
the statutes of this state, other than for a pen-
alty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, 
except where in special cases a different limi-
tation is prescribed by the statutes of this state. 
78-12-31. Within six months. 
An action against an officer, or an offi-
cer de facto: 
( 1) To recover any goods, wares, mer-
chandise or other property seized by any such 
officer in his official capacity as a tax collect-
or, or to recover the price or value of any 
goods, wares, merchandise or other personal 
property so seized, or for damages for the seiz-
ure, detention, sale of, or injury to, any goods, 
wares, merchandise or other personal proper-
ty seized, or for damages done to any person 
or property in making any such seizure. 
(2) For money paid to any such officer 
under protest, or seized by such officer in his 
official capacity, as a collector of taxes, and 
which, it is claimed, ought to be refunded. 
In defense of the six-year statute of limitations, 
it can be said in each instance that the State Insur-
ance Fund authorized plaintiff by writing to repre-
sent it, that there are ample memoranda to support 
this and that a running dispute arose as to the mat-
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ter of reimbursement. In the Scott case, the State 
Insurance Fund, by letter dated February 27, 1963 
(attached to the Complaint), said: 
" ... You are also authorized to represent 
the interests of the State Insurance Fund in 
proceedings against the third parties, upon a 
contingent attorney's fee of one-third of the 
amount recovered if, before the introduction 
of evidence in the trial, or one-third of such 
recovery if obtained after the introduction of 
evidence in a trial. The State Insurance Fund 
is entitled to full reimbursement before Scott 
shall receive any part of the recovery." 
In the Williams case the May 2, 1963 letter 
( R 10) to the State Insurance Fund (copy attached 
to Complaint); October 22, 1964 letter, Hunt to Wil-
liams (R7); October 22, 1964 letter, Hunt to Gordon 
R. Strong (R8), Attorney for third party and other 
corespondence (R9, R10) in the Williams file am-
ply substantiates a similar engagement by the In-
surance Fund of plaintiffs' counsel and a similar 
continuing dispute as to the matter of reimbursement 
of attorney's fees. 
In the Malo case, August 14, 1964 letter, State 
Insurance Fund to Gayla Dean Hunt (R4), reads 
in part: 
"You are authorized to represent the in-
terests of the State Insurance Fund in proceed-
ing against the third party and his liability 
insurance carrier upon the following terms: 
" 
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In the McNeely case a similar letter, August 
14, 1964 CR14), reads in part: 
"You are authorized to represent the in-
terest of the State Insurance Fund in proceed-
ings against the third party . . . " 
In the Roedel case, a similar letter dated Octo-
ber 6, 1964, ( R 19) reads in part: 
"You are authorized to represent the in-
terest of the State Insurance Fund in proceed-
ings against the third party and his liability 
insurance carrier . . . " 
If the memorandum should be deemed inade-
quate, then, of course, the four year statute would 
be applicable unless, as contended by defendant, a 
three year statute should be applied. This would de-
pend upon whether or not the cause of action is cre-
ated by statute under 78-12-26. 
The test is whether or not the cause of action 
would exist except for the statute. In Webber v. Salt 
Lake City, 120 Pac. 503, 40 Utah 221, compiled 
LAWS of Utah, 1907, Sec. 282, authorized the recov-
ery of damages to an a butting property owner by 
change of an established grade on the street. The de-
fendant contended plaintiff's cause of action arose 
by reason of a statute and that the statute of limita-
tions for statutory cause of action should apply. The 
Utah Supreme Court held not so; that the cause of 
action existed before and aside from and irrespective 
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of the statute in question and although the statute 
delineated the same, it did not create the cause of 
action and the statutory limitation provision did not 
apply. The court pointed out that constitutional pro-
visions, prior to the enactment of the statute, would 
have created the cause of action, the court saying, 
page 224: 
"As we have pointed out, the constitu-
tional provision existed when Section 282 was 
adopted. Moreover, the right to recover dam-
ages would continue precisely the same, al-
though section 282 were repealed. If a right 
or liability-call it what you will-therefore 
existed before section 282 was adopted, such 
right or liability was not created by that sec-
tion. Again, if the right or liability will con-
tinue in full force and effect, although that 
section were repealed, such right is not even 
exercised by virtue of that section. In other 
words, for the purpose of an action like the 
one at bar, the provisions of section 282 are 
not controlling or even material." 
The foregoing case is quoted in 34 Am Jur, Limi-
tation of Actions: 
§ 48. Statutory Liabilities 
Created by Statute-
Where laws create special statutory pro-
ceedings, the provisions of the general law of 
limitations are sometimes construed as not ap-
plying thereto. Thus, when there is no time 
limit within which such special statutory pro-
ceedings shall be commenced, the courts may 
construe the law as exempting the proceedings 
from all limitations and may refuse to apply 
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thereto a general law of limitations. It is the 
rule in most jurisdictions that such proceedings 
are not subject to the exceptions contained in 
a general statute of limitations. However, in 
most jurisdictions, the statutes of limitation 
contain special provisions prescribing the time 
within which actions upon liabilities created 
by statute must be commenced. To come with-
in the terms of such a provision, the liability 
must be one which would not exist except for 
a statute. \Vhether a statute creates by impli-
cation a cause of action, as regards the appli-
cation of a statute of limitations upon a cause 
of action so created, depends largely upon 
whether the duty is imposed for the benefit of 
a particular class of persons or whether it 
merely defines, in the interest of the general 
public, the degree of care to be exercised un-
der special circumstances. A right to damages 
for injuries to abutting property as a result 
of the change in the grade of a street, which 
is given by a Constitution, does not depend 
upon a statute passed to harmonize the statu-
tory law with the Constitution, and is not giv-
en by the statute, within the meaning of the 
statute of limitations, and the fact that a duty 
to pay money for work and materials which 
the defendant failed to perform was a statu-
tory one does not make the action one upon 
the statute, for such an action is on assumpsit. 
It has also been held that the statute of limi-
tations applicable to a suit by a school district 
which, through error in computing the appor-
tionment of school funds, has received less 
than its proportionate share, against districts 
which have in consequence received more 
than their share, is that relating to actions 
for relief on the ground of mistake, and not 
that relating to liabilities created by statute. 
On the other hand, in some jurisdictions the 
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limitation period pertaining to actions on sta-
tutory liabilities governs actions to enforce the 
statutory liability of stockholders, and, in prop-
er circumstances, such a provision applies to 
a suit between master and servant and to pro-
ceedings for the recovery of workmen's com-
pensation. There is a difference of opinion as 
to whether an action to enforce the liability 
of a surety on an administrator's bond, the giv-
ing of which is required by a statute prescrib-
ing the terms and conditions thereof, comes 
within such a provision. The general rules re-
lating to the application of the statute of limi-
tations to actions for the recovery of penalties 
are discussed in another article. 
As to the purpose of the statute in question, 35-
1-62, the language in the vVorthen case, supra, may 
be helpful: 
19 Utah Reports 2d Series, 1967, P.83 
"The basic purpose of this statute is that 
of making an equitable arrangement between 
an injured employee, and an insurer (or em-
ployer) who pays him workmen's compensa-
tion, with respect to a cause of action against 
a third party who injures the employee, but 
it prevents him from having double recovery 
by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. It 
also gives the insurer the right to bring the 
action, but allows it only to reimburse itself 
and then pay any balance to the employee. 
vVhere each of the parties has the right to 
bring the action and one takes the initiative 
and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both, 
it is only fair that each bear his share of the 
expenses necessarily incurred in doing so . ... " 
Certainly, if the party injured and the State In-
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surance Fund had joined in an original action for 
the mutual benefit of both against the third party, 
the obligation of each to bear its fair share of the 
joint venture would not depend upon any statute 
but upon ordinary rules governing a joint venture, 
hence the cause of action for one to force the other 
to contribute would not depend upon the statute but 
upon other principles. 
On principles of fairness it can be argued that 
the statute of limitations should run only from April 
7, 1967-the date the \Vorthen decision was struck, 
as prior thereto a plaintiff could not effectively as-
sert his rights. 
B. Laches and equitable estopple are inappli-
cable. 
18 Am Jur 2d Contribution, reads, page 132: 
Laches does not apply to an action at law 
for contribution, citing Vansant v. Gardner, 
240 Ky. 318, 42 SW2d 300; Friedman v. Mal-
tinsky, 260 Pa. 312, 103 A 731, and, it has been 
held, where there is concurrent jurisdiction 
over contribution in law and equity, the appli-
cation of the doctrine of laches must be influ-
enced by the spirit of the law of limitations. 
Where the relief sought is equitable in nature, 
however, laches may sometimes bar recov-
ery of contribution, and has been held to do 
so where the claimant failed to prosecute the 
claim within a reasonable time and in the life-
time of other parties who had knowledge of 
the facts. It has been held that laches, and not 
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statutory limitation, applies to the right of the 
paying obligor to be subrogated to the credit-
or's security. 
As in other cases, laches in an action for 
contribution is not, like limitation, a mere mat-
ter of time, although that is one of its import-
ant elements; there must be not only delay, 
but delay which works a disadvantage to an-
other, citing Vansant v. Gardner, 240 Ky 318, 
42 SW2d 300. 
As a general rule, laches cannot be suc-
cessfully asserted unless the delay was culp-
able and prejudice resulted. W aldref v. Dow, 
172 Minn. 52, 214 NW 767. 
A delay of 7 years has been considered 
not such laches as to bar relief on a bill for 
contribution in equity where no prejudice was 
caused thereby. Burrows v. M'Whann, 1 SC 
Eq ( 1 Desauss) 409. 
As to equitable estopple, the doctrine necessitates, 
among other elements, a change of position or status 
to the detriment or injury of the person claiming es-
topple. See 28 Am Jur 2d Estopple B Elements, Requi-
sites and Grounds, page 640. 
Here there is no detriment. 
Neither is there reliance on conduct of the claim-
ant, another essential element; nor conduct of the 
claimant designed to or capable of misleading or 
inconsistent with the position now taken; nor any 
intention to mislead; or superior knowledge of the 




COSTS AS WELL AS ATTORNEY FEES ARE RE-
IMBURSABLE. 
The district court ordered contribution as to at-
torney's fees but not as to costs. vVe submit it should 
have allowed costs. In the iv orthen v. Shurtleff case 
supra, the award appealed from and affirmed was for 
attorney's fees and costs. 
Furthermore, the statute clearly contemplates 
something other than attorney's fees in its reference 
to-
" ... reasonable expense of the action in-
cluding attorney's fees." 
In speaking of contribution in a different facet 
of the field, Am Jur aptly says (Contribution, p. 32): 
""\Vhere the claimant has paid costs under 
such a judgment they cannot be distinguished 
from the debt and every equitable principle 
·which entitles him to contribution, for the one 
applies equally to the other." 
Defendant asserts plaintiffs are not the proper 
parties. This is refuted by the record which confirms 
plaintiffs paid the sums here demanded. 
In discussing parties in Contribution actions, Am 
Jur 2d summarizes, p. 135: 
In general, the common obligor who has 
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paid more than his proportionate share of the 
common obligation is the proper party plain-
tiff in an action for contribution; he should 
sue in his own name and not in the name 
of the obligee whom he has paid. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiffs have brought an ordinary contribution 
action where the statute, as interpreted in the \Vor-
then case, clearly delineates how the third party pro-
ceeds should be allocated to the end that each party 
pays the fair share of the expenses including attor-
ney's fees. The case was really quite simple until 
barnacled with assertions of equitable estopple, etc. 
\Ve submit the trial court reduced the case to its prop-
er denominator and that this court has only to de-
cide: 
1. Does the rule in the \Yorthen case apply, 
2. \iVhich statute of limitation applies, and 
3. Does contribution apply to costs as well as 
attorney fees, 
and vYe respectfully urge that affinnance is com-
pelled by the law ancl the facts. 
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